Wilson in 1972 gave a generalization of Arrow's theorem without the Pareto axiom. We prove a version of Wilson's theorem for consensus functions on hierarchies.
Introduction
A hierarchy on a data set S is a classification scheme on S which is often the result of the application of a clustering algorithm to S. The application of two or more clustering algorithms to S is likely to produce more than one hierarchy on S. A consensus function takes as input k 2 hierarchies on S and outputs a single consensus hierarchy. The consensus hierarchy is supposed to be a good classification of the data set S. A careful choice of the consensus function is one way to achieve a reasonable consensus hierarchy. This choice could be made, in part, on the basis of some qualitative information involving consensus functions in general. This is one of the goals of the axiomatic approach to consensus [9] .
The ideal situation is for the researcher to formulate a list of desirable axioms that a consensus function should satisfy and search for the best method that satisfies these axioms. In practice, however, such a list could be inconsistent or could determine one or more unreasonable methods of consensus. For example, Arrow [1] proposed a list of axioms that a social welfare function should satisfy and determined that such a function must be dictatorial. One of Arrow's axioms is called the Pareto principle. Basically, the Pareto principle states that if each voter ranks a over b, then the output should have a over b. Wilson [17] generalized Arrow's theorem by replacing the Pareto axiom with the axiom of non-imposition (see Section 2) and determined that a social welfare function satisfying his list of axioms is either directly dictatorial, inversely dictatorial, or null. There is some recent work on the subtle relationship between the Arrow and Wilson theorems [7, 10] .
There is an extension of Arrow's theorem for hierarchies that uses a very natural analog of the Pareto principle [2, 3] . The Pareto principle for hierarchies states that if each input hierarchy contains the cluster A, then the consensus output should also contain A. The goal of this paper is to prove a version of Wilson's Theorem for consensus functions on hierarchies where the Pareto principle is replaced by a cluster based version of the axiom of non-imposition E-mail address: rcpowe01@louisville.edu (R.C. Powers). Maj(P ) = {A : A ∈ H i for more than half of the i s}.
The resulting consensus function is called majority rule [11] . Our goal is to study consensus functions on H(S) axiomatically. For example, C :
It is easy to see that majority rule satisfies the Pareto axiom. Another axiom is the requirement that whenever the profiles P and P agree on a subset X ⊆ S, then the consensus hierarchies C(P ) and C(P ) should also agree on X. There are many ways of defining this agreement as shown in [5] . One notion of agreement is based upon restriction. Specifically, if H ∈ H(S) and X is a proper subset of S, then H | X denotes the hierarchy whose non-trivial clusters are the non-empty distinct elements of {A ∩ X : A is a non-trivial cluster of H and 1 < |A ∩ X| < n}. In addition, H | X − X is the hierarchy H | X without the cluster X. Note that H, H | X and H | X − X are hierarchies on the same set S. This notion of restriction extends to profiles in a natural way. Specifically, for any profile
A consensus function C is removal independent if, for every X ⊆ S and profilesP , P ∈ H(S) K :
The axiom of removal independence was first proposed by Barthélemy et al. in [3] . There are two simple examples of removal independent consensus functions. The first example is a constant function, i.e., there exists a hierarchy H such that C(P ) = H for all profiles P. The second example is a projection, i.e., there exists j ∈ K such that for all P = (H 1 , . . . , H k ), C(P ) = H j . In [3] , removal independence restricted to three element subsets is called removal ternary independence. A thorough analysis of removal independence can be found in [14] .
In this paper we consider a new version of independence for hierarchical consensus functions. 
satisfies x-independence if, for every {a, b, c} ⊆ S and profiles P , P ∈ H(S) K :
If C satisfies x-independence for all x ∈ S, then C satisfies removal ternary independence and the possibilities are rather limited (see [14] ). We say that C satisfies minimal independence if it satisfies x-independence for at least one element x. The idea is to capture some notion of independence and at the same time to not restrict C so much that it does not allow for meaningful consensus.
There is an alternate description of x-independence. Define a mapping x : 
The consensus function C 1 is a restrictive version of majority rule; C 1 (P ) = Maj(P )\{A : 1 < |A| < n and x ∈ A}. It is not hard to show that C 1 satisfies minimal independence whereas Maj does not. To account for consensus functions like C 1 we offer the following definition. A consensus function C is partially null if there exists x ∈ S such that x (C(P )) = H ∅ for any profile P.
A ∈ H j and x ∈ A} ⊆ C(P ). We will say that C is dictatorial if there exists an individual j in K and an element x in S such that j is either a direct or inverse x-dictator. We will say that a subset A of S is non-trivial if 1 < |A| < n. A consensus function C satisfies (cluster) non-imposition if, for any non-trivial subset A of S, there exists a profile P such that A / ∈ C(P ). If C satisfies Pareto, then C satisfies non-imposition. Conversely, the constant function C(P ) = H ∅ for every profile P satisfies non-imposition but not Pareto.
We are now ready to state a hierarchical version of Wilson's Theorem.
Theorem 2. If |S| 4 and C : H(S) K → H(S) satisfies non-imposition and minimal independence, then C is partially null or dictatorial.
Observe that the consensus function C 1 given above or any projection function satisfies the conditions of our theorem. The proof of our result will be accomplished by applying Wilson's Theorem to the hierarchical setting. The details are given in the next section.
The proof
In this section it is assume that C : H(S) K → H(S) satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 2. Since C satisfies minimal independence there exists x ∈ S such that C satisfies x-independence. The next two results help us to establish a precise connection between weak orders and hierarchies.
Lemma 3. Let A ⊆ S and x ∈ A. For each H ∈ H(S), A ∈ H if and only if aR x H b for all a ∈ A\{x} and b /
Note that x, a ∈ V ab , V ab ∈ H , and V ab ⊆ A. By the maximality of B we get that V ab ⊆ B. So a ∈ B. Since a was arbitrary and x ∈ B it follows that A = B. Hence A ∈ H . To see that −1 is well-defined suppose A, B are non-trivial subsets of S belonging to −1 (Q) for some Q ∈ W(S\{x}). Then x ∈ A ∩ B. Assume A ∩ B / ∈ {A, B}. Then there exist a ∈ A\B and b ∈ B\A. Thus aQb and bQa contrary to Q being asymmetric. Therefore A ∩ B ∈ {A, B} and so −1 is well-defined.
It follows from Lemma 3 that H ⊆ −1 (R x H ) for each H ∈ H x (S). Finally, it is not hard to verify that −1 (R x H ) ⊆ H .
We need to extend the mapping . Define : ( x (H ) ). The mappings x , , −1 , and will be extended to profiles componentwise. For example, if P = (H 1 , . . . , H k ) , then x (P ) = ( x (H 1 ), . . . , x (H k ) ). Define a social welfare function
Our goal is to apply Theorem 1 to the function C x . It is not hard to show that C x satisfies independence. We will need the power of Wilson's Partition Lemma to prove that C x satisfies non-imposition.
We now show that the social welfare function C x satisfies independence. Suppose that for p, p ∈ W(S\{x}) The next two results establish a connection between the linear order > on and the weak order R x C(P ) on S\{x} where P is any profile in H(S) K .
Lemma 5. If Y > Z for Y, Z ∈ and max{|Y |, |Z|} 2, then aR x C(P ) b holds for all a ∈ Y \{x}, b ∈ Z, and P ∈ H(S)
K .
Proof. We will assume that |Z| 2.
We will show that aR x C(P ) b holds. Let c ∈ Z with c = b. Since b and c belong to the same component Z it follows that there exists a profile p ∈ W(S\{x}) K such that bC x (p)c fails.
. . , H k ) in H(S)
K such that all three of the following conditions hold:
(1) P | {x,a,b} − {x, a, b} = P | {x,a,b} − {x, a, b};
To see that such a profile does exist start with the four possibilities from (1 (1) we get aR x C(P ) b. The case where |Z| = 1 and |Y | 2 is done using an argument similar to the one given above. This completes our proof. At this stage we recall that C x satisfies independence and that is a partition of S\{x} satisfying the conditions of Wilson's Partition Lemma. The previous two lemmas will help us to prove the following fact.
We now consider the case where |Y | = |Z| = 1. We will show that either Y ∪ {x} or Y ∪ Z ∪ {x} belongs to C(P ) for every profile P. Let Y = {a}, Z = {b}, and c ∈ S\{x, a, b}.
Assume that there exists a profile P * in H(S) K such that bR x C(P * ) c fails. Let P be an arbitrary profile in H(S) K .
Choose P such that
(1) P | {x,a,b} − {x, a, b} = P | {x,a,b} − {x, a, b}; and (2) P | {x,b,c} − {x, b, c} = P * | {x,b,c} − {x, b, c}.
By x-independence, (2) , and the choice of P * we know that bR x C(P ) c fails. Since a ∈ Y and c / ∈ Y ∪ Z it follows from Lemma 6 that aR x C(P ) c holds. So aR x C(P ) b holds. By x-independence and (1), we know that aR x C(P ) b holds. If c = x does not belong to Y ∪ Z, then, as above, it follows from Lemma 6 that aR x C(P ) c holds for all P ∈ H(S) K . It follows from Lemma 3 that Y ∪ {x} = {a, x} ∈ C(P ) for all P. Finally, assume that there does not exist a profile P * in H(S) K such that bR x C(P * ) c fails. In other words, bR x C(P ) c holds for any profile P and c ∈ S\{x, a, b}. Also, by Lemma 6, aR x C(P * ) c holds for any profile P and c / ∈ Y ∪ Z ∪ {x}. In this case, it follows from Lemma 3 that Y ∪ Z ∪ {x} = {a, b, x} ∈ C(P ) for all P.
We have shown that if C x violates non-imposition, then C violates cluster non-imposition. Since C satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 2 it follows that C x satisfies non-imposition.
We now return to the proof of the main theorem. Since C x satisfies independence and non-imposition it follows from Theorem 1 that C x is either null or dictatorial.
We first consider the case where C x is directly dictatorial with j ∈ K a direct dictator. We will show that j is a direct x-dictator with respect to the consensus function C. Let P = (H 1 , . . . , H k ) be a profile where A ∈ H j and x ∈ A. We want to show that A ∈ C(P ). By Lemma 3, all we need to show is that Note that P | {a,b,x} − {a, b, x} = P | {a,b,x} − {a, b, x}.
Since j is a direct dictator and cp(j )b it follows that cC x (p)b and so cR x C(P ) b. Since P | {b,c,x} − {b, c, x} = P | {b,c,x} − {b, c, x} it follows from x-independence that cR x C(P ) b. Then P * | {a,c,x} − {a, c, x} = P | {a,c,x} − {a, c, x}.
Since j is a direct dictator and ap(j )c it follows that aC x (p)c and so aR x C(P * * ) c. Since P * * | {a,c,x} − {a, c, x} = P * | {a,c,x} − {a, c, x} and P * | {a,c,x} − {a, c, x} = P | {a,c,x} − {a, c, x} it follows from x-independence that aR x C(P ) c. Now aR x C(P ) c and cR x C(P ) b imply that aR x C(P ) b since the relation R x C(P ) is transitive. Recall that P | {a,b,x} − {a, b, x} = P | {a,b,x} − {a, b, x} and so, by x-independence, aR x C(P ) b. The next step is to consider the case where j is an inverse dictator. Define a new consensus function C : H(S) K → H(S) by C(P ) = H ∅ ∪ {A c ∪ {x} : A ∈ x (C(P ))} for all profiles P = (H 1 , . . . , H k ) . Then j is a direct dictator with respect to the social welfare function C x where C replaces C in the definition of C x . It is not hard to verify that C satisfies x-independence and non-imposition. Therefore, by the argument given above, j is a direct x-dictator with respect to the consensus function C. Thus j is an inverse x-dictator with respect to C.
The final step is to consider the case where C x is null. We can show that C is partially null. For any profile P in H(S) K and for any non-trivial cluster A ∈ C(P ) it follows that x / ∈ A. Hence C is partially null and the proof of Theorem 2 is complete.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we were able to embed and extend Wilson's theorem for weak orders to a result involving consensus functions on hierarchies. In the context of weak orders, if the axiom of non-imposition is dropped, then one is lead to the very general result of Wilson's Partition Lemma. White [16] was able to extend Wilson's Partition Lemma to a hierarchical setting using the axiom of x-independence. His approach was based upon representing a hierarchy as a special type of ternary relation (see [12] ). Another way of representing a hierarchy as a ternary relation can be found in [8] .
There is still work to be done. For example, there is a version of Arrow's theorem for weak hierarchies but there is no version of Wilson's theorem for weak hierarchies [13] . In another direction, Campbell and Kelly use Wilson's Partition Lemma to obtain a very interesting trade-off result [6] . Roughly, this result says that for any fraction t in (0, 1), either there will be some individual who dictates on subset containing at least the fraction t of alternatives, or at least the fraction 1 − t of the ordered pairs of alternatives have their social ranking fixed independently of individual preference. Using the results of this paper and the main result from [16] it would be interesting to extend the trade-off theorem to consensus functions on hierarchies.
